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THE PROPOSED INCREASE OF THE ARMY.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE D. RUGGLES, ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY.

THE strength of the enlisted men in the permanent military establishment, or, as it is popularly known, the Regular Army, was established by law in 1866, one year after the close of the late war, at 51,605. This was reduced in 1869 to 35,036, and again in 1870 to 30,000. From that time till 1874 it remained at the last named figure. In 1874, for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1875, Congress appropriated for only 25,000 men, and the same for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1876. Later in 1876 this number was temporarily increased 2,500 on account of Indian hostilities in the Northwest following the Custer massacre, with the proviso that it should be reduced at the cessation of such hostilities. This reduction was made in 1877. From that time till 1879 appropriations were for 25,000 men only. In 1879 the strength of the army was fixed definitely by act of Congress at 25,000 men, "unless otherwise authorized by law."

At the time of this reduction, the organization of the line was the same as it is to-day, to wit: Ten regiments of cavalry, five regiments of artillery, and twenty-five regiments of infantry. Each regiment of cavalry consisted of twelve troops or companies; each regiment of artillery of twelve batteries or companies, ten of which were foot and two mounted; each regiment of infantry of ten companies. The reduction so crippled the companies of cavalry and infantry that in order to give them proper strength for independent movements, it was found necessary to consolidate the twelve troops into ten, and the ten companies into eight, by transferring to them the enlisted men belonging to the other two, and leaving the organization of these two on paper only. Conse-

quently, a regiment of cavalry to-day consists of ten troops with two skeleton troops, and a regiment of infantry of eight companies with two skeleton companies.

This number of 25,000 is then the maximum organization at the present time, with one-sixth of the cavalry and one-fifth of the infantry regiments existing simply on paper. While to the average mind this signifies a strength of 25,000 fighting soldiers, the number that actually bear arms, the number whose duties place them in action upon the line of battle, is much less. An army is necessarily composed of combatants and non-combatants. The non-combatants are those charged with necessary military duties which, if not performed by them, would withdraw fighting men from the line of battle. To ascertain the strength of this line of battle, there must be deducted from the 25,000 maximum: the United States Military Academy detachment; the Leavenworth Military Prison guard; the Engineer Battalion, which, though always at the front and much exposed, has special duties which preclude it from place on the battle line; the Ordnance detachment; ordnance sergeants as distinguished from the Ordnance detachment; commissary sergeants, post quartermaster sergeants, recruits and recruiting parties, and existing vacancies, making a total of about 2,100 men. There must also be deducted scouts, bands, field music, litter bearers, cooks and other special duty men, the sick, prisoners, etc., making a grand total of about 5,000 men. The fighting line may then be estimated very closely at 20,000 men.

The duties of this fighting line are to guard the Indian reservations from the encroachments of the white man and to prevent Indian outbreaks; to escort government expeditions and government treasure wherever protection may be required; to patrol the frontier along the free zone of Mexico so as to prevent smuggling and intercept smugglers; to man our seacoast forts, and to guard the extensive outlying line of seacoast; to protect the mints, the postoffices, the treasury and sub-treasuries, the United States court-houses, and all other public property; and, when ordered by the President, to support the civil authorities in the suppression of violence that would interfere with the transmission of the mails or would interrupt commerce between the States; and to assist in the suppression of insurrection in the States upon the call of such States and the order of the President.

By the census of 1890 the total Indian population is reported as 249,273. Of this number there were on Indian reservations or at school 133,382. The balance consists of the five civilized nations—the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles; the six nations, the Saint Regis, and other Indians of New York; the Eastern Cherokees of North Carolina; the Indians taxed or taxable and self-sustaining; Indian prisoners of war; and Indians, 184 in number, in penitentiaries. In the vicinity of the great Indian reservations occupied by the 133,382 Indians, under charge of the Indian Office, the presence of troops is found to be necessary.

Communication throughout the land is secured by 176,461 miles of railway. These are the iron bands which unite the States and make for us a more perfect union. Communication over them is to be kept open as the Union is to be preserved.

The length of our Atlantic seacoast is 2,043 statute miles, increased by indentations to head of tidewater to 36,607 statute miles; of the Gulf coast 1,852 miles, or 1,923 miles with indentations; and of the Pacific coast, excluding Alaska, 1,810 miles.

On the Atlantic coast, directly exposed to bombardment from the sea, are thirty-two principal seaports; on the Gulf coast five, and on the Pacific coast four. To garrison this line of coast we have now fifty foot batteries, or companies, of a maximum organization of sixty-five men each.

The report of the Endicott Board on Fortifications and other Defences of 1886 presents the views of representative officers of the army and navy, and professional experts in civil life, and is the most detailed and most conservative ever made on this subject.

According to it, an armament of not less than 1299 modern breech-loading guns and mortars is necessary for a reasonable protection of twenty-seven of our principal seaports. For the defence of mine-fields, small channels, and ports of less importance, reliance is placed upon the old smooth-bore and eight-inch muzzle-loading rifle armament, which we have already available.

The modern gun, with its mounting, is not only a costly but also a delicate machine. It is an instrument of precision, of which every part must be in perfect order. It is manœuvred by steam, hydraulic, and electrical machinery. Its service requires, besides cannoneers, expert engineers and electricians.

The artillery council assembled by Major-General Schofield, now General-in-Chief, when in command of the Division of the Atlantic, decided that the new armament of New York harbor would require, in war, 6,696 cannoneers for its service, as follows:

18 breech-loading rifles, 110-ton guns, 16 men each,	288 men
2 breech-loading rifles, 80-ton guns, 16 men each,	32 men
40 breech-loading rifles, 50-ton guns, 12 men each,	480 men
20 breech-loading rifles, 27-ton guns, 8 men each,	160 men
15 breech-loading rifles, 13-ton guns, 8 men each,	120 men
144 rifled mortars, 12-inch, 8 men each.....	1,152 men
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	2,232 men

One day's action would require three reliefs per gun, or a total of 6,696 men. From this as a basis of calculation, it may be estimated that, for a reasonably efficient defence in time of war of twenty-seven principal seaport posts of the United States, a minimum of 42,500 artillerymen would be required. As many more would be needed for the smooth-bore and rifled guns of the old armament. Thus, an efficient land defence of all our seaports in time of war is estimated at not less than 85,000 artillerymen. No government maintains in peace the heavy artillery force necessary in war. Foreign nations, as a rule, maintain a peace footing of not less than one-fifth of the war strength of its fortress artillery. But while this proportion may not be expected from our people, it is not too much to ask, in consideration of the long and careful training that these men require, that one-fourth of this one-fifth, or one-twentieth of the war strength be maintained in time of peace. This would furnish a minimum peace footing of 4,250 heavy artillery troops, or seven regiments of six hundred artillery, plus fifty mechanical and electrical engineers. These 4,250 men will afford meagre garrisons for existing works at only the more important of our seaports, and will be simply sufficient for the ordinary care of their costly armaments. They will furnish a mere leaven of gunners for the total force required in war. That, from motives of economy alone, there should be this reasonable number of peace-trained gunners is evident from the fact that a single round, of maximum cost, wasted, is equivalent to the pay of one soldier for five years, and that a single round, of minimum cost, wasted, is equivalent to the pay of a soldier for

about nine months. This will appear more clearly from the following table :

Gun.	Projectile.			Powder.		Total.
	Weight.	Material.	Cost.	Weight.	Cost.	Cost.
16 inch rifle.....	2,370 lbs.	Steel	\$711.00	1,060 lbs.	\$116.00	\$827.00
12-inch rifle.....	1,000 lbs.	Steel	300.00	435 lbs.	117.45	417.45
10-inch rifle.....	575 lbs.	Steel	172.50	250 lbs.	67.50	240.00
8-inch rifle.....	300 lbs.	Steel	90.00	130 lbs.	35.10	125.10
12-inch mortar..	630 lbs.	Steel	94.50	80 lbs.	21.60	116.10

Evidently there will be poor economy in untrained gunners for war service.

Like necessity exists for the instruction of the light artillery, the cavalry, and the infantry man.

The modern manner of attack and defence, the necessity for training in the art of moving with the minimum of loss over the extensive zones of modern fire, warn us that we should not repeat the expensive lessons of 1861 and 1862 of bringing our men, without previous instruction, into actual conflict on the field of battle at a deadly sacrifice of life and wicked waste of the country's money.

For field artillery service there are now attached to each artillery regiment two light batteries, or ten in all. For the increased artillery force it is estimated that twelve light batteries will meet requirements. To the strength of the seven regiments there must be added, for light artillery service, nine hundred men.

We must recognize the fact that the artillery defence is a pressing and immediate necessity. Our British neighbors already threaten our entire seacoast, immediately at our doors, from Halifax on the north ; from Bermuda on the south, in whose capacious harbor the entire British navy can find rendezvous ; from the Bahamas ; along our Gulf coast, from the British West Indian stations ; on the Pacific, from Esquimault in British Columbia. We are thus surrounded by a cordon of British posts from which within forty-eight hours a British enemy can be launched upon our shores. We must appreciate the fact that while during the Revolutionary war armies from Europe were placed upon our soil after six weeks' passage, the transit of the

Atlantic can now be accomplished in less than six days. We can no longer rest in the assurance that because we outnumber and live at peace with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors, and are separated by great stretches of water from other nations, we may fear no harm. Our people in the interior must no longer dream that, because they are distant from the seacoast, an attack upon our seaports cannot affect them. They should realize that every dollar of property destroyed by the bombardment of any one of our maritime cities, every dollar looted from our banks or our sub-treasuries there, is to be reflected by a corresponding loss in their own local banks and in their individual pockets. And, independently of the disgrace which would come to us as a nation by the successful bombardment by an enemy of any one of our seacoast cities, the cost in money and the disaster which would thus be effected in a few days would far exceed the expense of proper defence for years.

The General-in-Chief, Major-General Schofield, in his report to the Secretary of War, has set forth his views in these words :

"It seems clear that the effective strength of the army should now be considerably increased. Yet this can be done at a very small comparative increase in cost. The present regimental organizations need not be largely increased. Two additional regiments of artillery for the necessary seacoast defence; two additional regiments of cavalry to patrol the long lines of railroad under government protection; and the present twenty-five regiments of infantry, converted into three battalion organizations, would, it is believed, be a just, conservative estimate of what is now actually needed. For this the existing number of commissioned officers is nearly sufficient. But a considerable permanent increase in the enlisted strength of the army should be made, and a still further increase authorized to be made by the President when, in his judgment, an emergency requiring it may reasonably be foreseen."

The enlisted force thus outlined by the General would be as follows :

Heavy artillery.....	4,250
Light artillery, 12 batteries, 75 men each.....	900
Twelve regiments of cavalry.....	8,820
Twenty-five regiments of infantry, three battalions each, with strength of 80 men to the company.....	24,625
Staff departments, as now organized.....	1,124
	<hr/> 39,719

or, in round numbers, 40,000 men.

Of this force, two troops in each regiment of cavalry may be skeletonized as at present, and the third battalion in each regiment of infantry may not be filled till required. The strength of these skeletonized troops of cavalry is 1,560, and of the third

battalions of the twenty-five regiments, 8,000 men, making a total of 9,560. While these should be provided for in the organization, the law may prescribe that they shall not be called out save by order of the President in case of emergency. Deducting this number of 9,560 from the round total of 40,000 men, the remainder, 30,440 men, is the number now actually needed.

It thus appears that 5,500 men should be immediately added to the present enlisted force of 25,000, which would bring it to the standard of 30,500, or 500 in excess of that at which, after reduction, it was established twenty-four years ago. These men would be combatants. The cost of additional men is moderate. The cost of a private soldier for pay, subsistence, and clothing is \$272 per year.

For this increased force there will be required an inconsiderable number of additional officers to replace those who were discharged as supernumeraries in the reduction of 1870. They can be furnished by the promotion of faithful officers of long service who have grown gray in the lower grades, and by filling the few vacancies at the foot of the list from graduates of the Military Academy, by promotion of worthy men from the ranks, or by appointments from civil life.

GEO. D. RUGGLES.